A federal judge ruled at the end of September that a law firm that had mass produced collection letters and legal documents violated the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA).
According to the New York Law Journal, Eastern District of New York Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf held in Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, that the “attorney review practices prior to both the issuance of the debt-collection letter signed by Slamowitz and the commencement of legal action were inadequate for [FDCPA] purposes, thus rendering misleading these communications with Miller.”
The ruling stems from a case in which the plaintiff, Arthur Miller, didn’t respond to a collection letter signed by collection attorney Michael Slamowitz. The letter gave Miller 30 days to contest a $1,678 balance that he owed Lord & Taylor in 2000. He failed to respond in that time frame, but eventually settled with the retailer before suing Upton Cohen & Slamowitz, the National Attorney Network and a third party information exchange service that made the referral between the firms, citing the attorney review section of FDCPA.
According to the Journal, the firm issued “no fewer than 211 debt collection letters” on the date of Miller’s. That volume, “coupled with practices followed in the Miller matter supports the conclusion that the debt collection letter and litigation were regularly mass-produced by non-lawyers at the push of a button.”
“In my analysis, the Miller Court brought the discussion of meaningful involvement to a new level of ‘there is no such thing as imputed meaningful involvement,’” Barbara Sinsley, counsel to DBA International, an association for debt buying professionals, told insideARM. “More importantly, the Court indicated that where no meaningful review is made by an attorney, that the failure to disclaim that fact, runs afoul of the [FDCPA].”
Sinsley noted that the Miller case provides additional direction for accounts receivable management companies with a new precedent on the matter of collection letters.
“In the case of Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, and Thomas, the Second Circuit held that an attorney could disclaim meaningful involvement by placing the following in their letters: ‘At this time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account.’”